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Abstract
In economic studies, it is standard practice to pay out the reward of only one randomly selected trial (pay-one) instead of the total reward
accumulated across trials (pay-all), assuming that both methods are equivalent. We tested this assumption by recording electrophys-
iological activity to reward feedback from participants engaged in a decision-making task under both a pay-one and a pay-all condition.
We show that participants are approximately 12%more risk averse in the pay-one condition than in the pay-all condition. Furthermore,
we observed that the electrophysiological response to monetary rewards, the reward positivity, is significantly reduced in the pay-one
condition relative to the pay-all condition. The difference of brain responses is associated with the difference in risky behavior across
conditions. We concluded that the two payment methods lead to significantly different results and are therefore not equivalent.
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Introduction
Research on economic decision-making has gained a lot of
attention recently. Two pioneers in this field, Kahneman and
Tversky, were awarded the Nobel prize in 2002, because they
identified heuristics contradicting the view that humans are
rational decision makers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Later, neuroscientists identified the anterior cingulate cortex
as a key brain area involved in decision making (Gehring &
Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2008). Activation of the
anterior cingulate cortex can be assessed with an electroen-
cephalogram (EEG) signal that is sensitive to monetary re-
wards and losses (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Because
neuroeconomic studies need many trials to obtain reliable es-
timates of the brain responses that they measure, participants
make many economic decisions in such studies. Each of these
decisions is associated with a certain monetary reward.
Because it can be expensive to pay participants the total
reward accumulated across trials (pay-all), many behavioral ex-
perimenters instead pay only the reward associated with one
randomly selected trial (pay-one) to reduce the costs of the study
(De Martino et al., 2010). The use of the pay-one method was
justified by findings concluding that paying out only one trial is
equivalent to paying out all of the trials, as summarized in a
recent overview by Charness, Gneezy & Halladay (2016).
Many of these findings suffer from methodological problems,
for example, by comparing payment conditions with unequal
expected values. Interestingly, one of the most influential econ-
omists of the 20th century, Paul Samuelson, famously stated
decades ago that it is less attractive to play a gamble once com-
pared with playing a gamble 100 times (Samuelson, 1963, cited
after Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz, 1997), which
suggests that the pay-one and the pay-all method may be differ-
ent from each other. In particular, a risky decision on one trial of
a pay-one paradigm could—in the event of a loss—result in the
participant leaving the experiment with no winnings at all. Pay-
one paradigms therefore are riskier than pay-all paradigms, and
participants accordingly make fewer risky decisions in them
(Schmidt &Hewig, 2015). Still, the pay-one method is typically
adopted as a convenient and equivalent substitute for the pay-all
method (Charness et al., 2016).
* Barbara Schmidt
schmidt.barbara@uni-jena.de
1 Institute of Psychology, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Am
Steiger 3, Haus 1, 07743 Jena, Germany
2 Institute of Psychology, Julius Maximilians University of Würzburg,
Würzburg, Germany
3 Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC,
Canada
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience (2019) 19:187–196
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-018-00656-1
# Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2018
In the economic paradigm used in our study, we equalized
the expected values of both payment methods by multiplying
the outcome of the randomly selected trial with the number of
trials. Although economic studies using the pay-one method
do not typically do this, which would result in spending the
same amount of money on participants’ winnings as they
would have received in the pay-all condition anyway, we did
so to compare the two payment methods directly. Although
other studies have adopted different pay-out procedures, such
as paying out a certain percentage of trials or incorporating
monetary losses in addition to monetary gains, our goal was to
highlight the difference between pay-one and pay-all payment
methods. For this reason, we chose the extreme version of
paying out only one randomly selected trial. In addition, we
only included monetary gains because of the nonsymmetric
value function in the gain and loss domain (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979), which would make a comparison between
payment methods complicated.
In the current study, we investigated the neural mechanisms
that underlie the behavioral differences associated with the
two payment methods. We recorded electrophysiological ac-
tivity from the scalp of human participants engaged in a
decision-making task that was played once under a pay-one
instruction and once under a pay-all instruction. We analyzed
the reward positivity, a reward-related brain response occur-
ring in the event-related potential (ERP) approximately
280 ms after feedback stimuli in decision tasks. The reward
positivity is more positive-going after gain or correct feedback
than after loss or error feedback (Miltner et al., 1997) and is
sensitive to violations in outcome expectation, being more
negative when an outcome is worse than expected and more
positive when an outcome is better than expected (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Walsh & Anderson, 2012; Sambrook & Goslin,
2015). Importantly for our purpose, the reward positivity is
related to individual differences in reward processing and cog-
nitive control. For example, reward positivity amplitude is
larger in populations associated with decreased control, such
as problem gamblers (Hewig et al., 2010), high temporal dis-
counters (Cherniawsky & Holroyd, 2013), adolescents
(Huang et al., 2017), and impulsive individuals (Schmidt
et al., 2017; for review see Holroyd & Umemoto, 2016). In
addition, high reward positivity amplitudes predict irrational
choices in the Ultimatum Game (Hewig et al., 2011). These
findings suggest that a lower amount of cognitive control is
associated with higher reward positivity amplitudes.
Consequently, a higher amount of cognitive control is associ-
ated with smaller reward positivity amplitudes (Schmidt et al.,
2017). With regard to our study, we predicted a higher amount
of cognitive control in the pay-one condition as participants
have to keep themselves from acting too risky. This higher
amount of cognitive control should be associated with smaller
reward positivity amplitudes in the pay-one condition.
Furthermore, we predicted that the difference in reward
positivity amplitudes between the two conditions would be
positively correlated with the difference in risky behavior be-
tween the conditions across individuals.
As a control, we also examined the amplitude of the P300,
an ERP component elicited by task-relevant stimuli over pos-
terior areas of the scalp (Donchin & Coles, 1988). The P300
has been intensively studied in so-called oddball paradigms in
which frequent and rare stimuli are presented to participants.
Rarely presented stimuli elicit a larger P300 compared with
frequently presented stimuli, which is called the oddball ef-
fect. The P300 amplitude is enhanced when participants are
instructed to pay attention to the rare stimuli, for example by
pressing a button each time they hear it. The P300 is therefore
sensitive to task engagement or motivation (Polich, 2007,
Carrillo-de-la-Pena & Cadaveira, 2000). Crucially, if our pre-
dictions are correct, then the effect of the payment method
should be specific to the reward processing function indexed
by the reward positivity, as opposed to more general differ-
ences in motivation and arousal that affect P300 amplitude.
Past research showed that P300 amplitudes are sensitive to
reward magnitude (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; Sato et al., 2005;
Wu & Zhou, 2009; Kreussel et al., 2012). Therefore, we ex-
pected larger P300 amplitudes after positive monetary feed-
back that indicates a bigger monetary reward. However, we
did not predict a difference in P300 amplitude between the
pay-one and pay-all conditions.
In sum, we predicted that participants would behave less
riskily and produce smaller reward positivity amplitudes in the
pay-one condition compared to the pay-all condition.
Furthermore, we predicted that these two measures would be
correlated across participants, in line with our assumption that
the two payment methods engage different neurocognitive
processes that result in different behavior.
Methods
Participants
As the effect size of different risk behavior in the two payment
conditions was d = 0.5 in our previous study (Schmidt &
Hewig, 2015), we computed the required sample size (36) to
detect an effect of d = 0.5 with alpha level of 0.05 and power
of 0.9 with G*power (Faul et al., 2007). For our study, we
recruited 40 participants (20 females, 20 males) who were on
average 23.3 years old (range: 18-38 years, standard deviation
[SD] = 4.5 years) by advertisements and via e-mail lists at the
University of Jena. Participants were students at the
University of Jena. The ethics committee of the Faculty of
Social and Behavioral Sciences of the Friedrich Schiller
University of Jena approved the study, and the study is in line
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
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Payment
Payment depended on the outcomes in the two risk conditions.
In the pay-all condition, the outcomes of all 120 trials of the
risk game were summed up. In the pay-one condition, one of
the 120 trials was randomly chosen after the condition was
finished and the associated outcome was multiplied by 120.
The expected value for both conditions was therefore 2
(conditions) * 120 (risk trials in each condition) * 5.5 cents
(expected value in every trial of the risk game) = 13.20 Euros.
In our study, participants won on average 14.18 Euros (SD =
4.87 Euros). In addition, participants received 6 Euros per
hour for participation or course credit.
Procedure
In the beginning of the experiment, participants read written
instructions and signed an informed consent statement. Then,
an electrode cap for recording the electroencephalogram
(EEG) was placed on their heads. Participants were seated in
a dimly lit room on a comfortable chair in front of a computer
monitor at a distance of approximately 100 cm. They com-
pleted both the pay-one and pay-all conditions in a single
experimental session. The sequential order of conditions was
counterbalanced across participants. The experiment was per-
formed using Presentation® software (Version 18.0,
Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.
neurobs.com). Experimental sessions lasted approximately 2
hours. We prepared the electrode cap in approximately 45
minutes. Each payment condition with risk game lasted
approximately 20 minutes, so both lasted approximately 40
minutes. Afterwards, participants washed the electrode gel
from their hair.
Risk game Participants played a risk game as described in past
studies from our laboratory (Schmidt, Mussel & Hewig, 2013;
Schmidt & Hewig, 2015; Schmidt, Kanis, Holroyd, Miltner &
Hewig, 2018). Each game included two blocks for each ex-
perimental condition (pay-one and pay-all). At the beginning
of each condition, participants were told which payment meth-
od would be applied. To test their comprehension, they were
requested to repeat this instruction in their own words. When
the experimenter was not sure if the participant got it right, she
asked the participants to describe the payment instruction in
more detail. In our experiment, all participants were able to
describe the payment instruction correctly in their own words.
Each condition consisted of 120 trials. At the beginning of
each trial, a fixation cross was shown for a random interval
between 1,000 and 2,000 ms (Figure 1). Then, two options
were presented that differed in their associated risk. Both of
these options consisted of two monetary rewards. The expect-
ed value of both options was always 5.5 cents, and the degree
of riskiness differed between the options: from 11 cents vs. 0
cents as the riskiest option and 6 cents vs. 5 cents as the safest
option. The participants always chose between the riskiest
option (11 cents vs. 0 cents) and one of the other less risky
options, presented to the participants in random order and at
random locations. Each of the five option combinations was
presented 24 times per block. Participants were required to
choose an option by pressing one of two corresponding but-
tons. After another random interval between 500 and 1,000
ms, two cards were shown face-down (Figure 1). Participants
chose one of the cards by pressing one of two buttons with
their right hand. After another random interval between 500
and 1,000 ms, the back of the selected card was shown,
displaying either a diamond that indicated the higher monetary
reward (positive feedback) or a square that indicated the lower
monetary reward (negative feedback), together with the state-
ment "You get XX cents!" for 1,500 ms. Unbeknownst to the
participants, on 50% of the trials the monetary feedback was
positive and on the other 50% the monetary feedback was
negative, delivered at random independently of their choices.
All stimuli in the risk game occupied approximately 10° of
visual angle horizontally and 5° vertically. Each condition
lasted approximately 20 minutes. Immediately following the
pay-all condition, feedback indicating the total accumulated
rewards was presented to the participants in one sum.
Immediately following the pay-one condition, participants
were presented with feedback indicating the outcome of one
randomly selected trial multiplied by the number of trials
(120). Please note that expected values were equal for the
two payment conditions. Then, participants rated each option
according to its valence, arousal, and riskiness on 9-point
Likert scales, using the self-assessment manikin pictures
(Bradley & Lang, 1994) for valence and arousal ratings.
High ratings indicate high valence, high arousal, and high
riskiness, respectively. At the end of the experiment, partici-
pants received feedback concerning their total earnings across
both conditions and were paid the corresponding amount.
Risk questionnaire After finishing the risk game, participants
completed a risk questionnaire (Schmidt & Hewig, 2015) that
consisted of two questions corresponding to the two payment
conditions, following recommendations of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). Corresponding to the pay-all condition, par-
ticipants were asked to choose between the options B11 or 0
cents^ and B6 or 5 cents^ when allowed to play 120 trials.
Corresponding to the pay-one condition, participants were
asked to choose between the options B1,320 or 0 cents^ and
B720 or 600 cents.^ The numbers are the product of the out-
come in one trial and the number of trials: 11 cents * 120 trials
= 1,320 cents, 6 cents * 120 trials = 720 cents, 5 cents * 120
trials = 600 cents.
EEG recording The electroencephalogram was recorded using
BrainAmp amplifiers (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching,
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Germany) from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted on partici-
pants’ heads, including one electrode under the left eye. All
electrodes were referenced to the electrode FCz. Additionally,
one electrode served for heart rate recording. Impedances of all
electrodes were kept below 10 kΩ. Data were band-pass filtered
online from 0.016 Hz (10-sec time constant) to 250 Hz.
ERP quantification
For analysis of EEG data, the sampling rate was reduced from
500 Hz to 250 Hz. For eye artifact correction, independent
component analysis (ICA) was used as proposed by Debener
et al. (2010). Eye-related artifact components were removed
by back-projection of all remaining components. The artifact-
corrected data were then re-referenced to the mean of elec-
trodes TP9 and TP10. For ERP analysis, the data were filtered
with a low-pass filter of 20 Hz. For each participant and chan-
nel, the EEG data were then segmented into epochs around the
event of interest, which is the outcome feedback in the risk
game [−200 ms; 1,000 ms] and baseline-corrected [−200 ms;
0 ms]. Residual artifacts were identified by statistical criteria,
namely joint probability and kurtosis. We used the EEGLAB
function pop_jointprob for rejection of epochs based on joint
probability with the local and global thresholds of 3 standard
deviations. For rejection of epochs based on kurtosis, we used
the EEGLAB function pop_rejkurt with local and global
thresholds of 3 standard deviations. Epochs with artifacts were
then removed. To quantify ERP responses in the risk game,
we computed grand averages for each electrode, condition,
and participant.
The reward positivity was evaluated within a time window
between 272ms and 300ms after the presentation ofmonetary
feedback, following the recommendation of Sambrook &
Goslin (2015). Originally termed the feedback error-related
negativity (FRN; Miltner et al., 1997), this ERP component
was renamed because of its apparently greater sensitivity to
positive rather than negative feedback (Holroyd et al., 2008;
Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Proudfit, 2015). We assessed the
average amplitude of the raw waveforms in the window of
interest. In the following, we will call this component FRN.
Furthermore, to minimize overlap with other ERP compo-
nents (Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Sambrook & Goslin,
2015), we also assessed the average value of the difference
wavewithin this window, which was calculated by subtracting
the ERP to negative feedback from the ERP to positive feed-
back (i.e., positive - negative). Hence, more positive values
correspond to larger reward positivities. These amplitudes
were computed for all scalp electrode locations, but the reward
positivity was evaluated at channel FCz, where it is maximal
(Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007). The P300
amplitude was assessed as the average value of the voltages
recorded at channel Pz, where it is normally maximal (Polich,
2007), between 328 ms and 380 ms after feedback onset.
Software and Statistics
For offline data processing, EEGLAB (Delorme, & Makeig,
2004) running under the MATLAB environment (The
MathWorks, Inc.) was used. Statistical analyses were per-
formed with R (R Development Core Team, 2016). For
between-group t tests, we used the Welch unequal variances
t test implemented in R that corrects the degrees of freedom in
case of unequal variances. We used Cohen’s d to quantify
effect sizes for t tests. For within-group tests, we used the
formula Cohen’s d = t-value/root (sample size) as recommend-
ed by Lakens (2013) in equation 7. For between-group tests,
Figure 1 Time-course of one trial in both payment conditions.
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we used the standard formula for Cohen’s d. For ANOVA
effects, we report generalized eta-squared values as effect size.
We tested one-tailed in the analysis of risk choices in the risk
game, as we had the specific hypothesis of less risky behavior
in the pay-one condition compared with the pay-all condition
based on previous results (Schmidt & Hewig, 2015).
Results
Risk choices in risk game
Participants chose the riskier option significantly less often in
the pay-one condition (36%) than in the pay-all condition
(48%): t(39) = 2.5, p = 0.008 (one-tailed), d = 0.4 (Figure 2,
left panel).
Only first condition analyzed To rule out the possibility that
this finding resulted from the order of the conditions, we also
analyzed only the first condition for every participant, that is,
we analyzed the data as a between-subjects design rather than
as a within-subjects design. Despite omitting half of the data,
the effect remained statistically significant: t(35.41) = 2.6, p =
0.007 (one-tailed), d = 0.8. In this analysis, participants were
23% less risky in the pay-one condition compared with the
pay-all condition. The percentage of risky decisions in the
pay-one condition was 39%, in the pay-all condition 62%.
Response time in risk game
There were no significant differences in response time be-
tween the payment conditions, neither for response times for
the risk choice (p = 0.8), nor concerning response times for the
card choice (p = 0.7). The mean response time for the risk
choice was 1.41 seconds (SE: 0.07 seconds) and for the card
choice 0.62 seconds (SE: 0.04 seconds).
Risk questionnaire
Fewer participants chose the riskier option on the risk ques-
tionnaire in the pay-one condition (8/40) compared with the
pay-all condition (17/40). Application of the McNemar test
indicated that this difference was significant: Χ2 (1) = 4.9, p
= 0.03, φ = 0.4 (Figure 2, right panel). Risk behavior and risk
questionnaire answers were significantly correlated across
participants: for the pay-one condition r = 0.51, p < 0.001
and for the pay-all condition r = 0.46, p = 0.003.
Ratings of options in risk game
Separate analyses of variance on the valence, arousal, and
riskiness ratings of the risk options, with task condition
(pay-one, pay-all) and risk option (6:5 cents, 7:4 cents, 8:3
cents, 9:2 cents, 10:1 cents, 11:0 cents) as within-subject fac-
tors, revealed main effects of risk option for all ratings (va-
lence F(5,195) = 7.8, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.10, arousal F(5,195) =
45.2, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.27, and riskiness F(5,195) = 234.4, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.74). Visual inspection of the data indicates lower
valence, higher arousal, and higher perceived riskiness with
increasing riskiness of the options (Figure 3).
Moreover, there was a significant interaction of condition
and option for the valence ratings, F(5,195) = 6.1, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.03; all other interactions for the three analyses of var-
iance did not reach significance. Post-hoc tests indicated that
participants rated the riskiest option (11:0 cents), t(39) = 4.3, p
< 0.001, d = 0.7, and the second-riskiest option (10:1 cents),
t(39) = 2.1, p = 0.04, d = 0.3, as less positive in the pay-one
condition compared to the pay-all condition. Furthermore, the
difference between the valence ratings for the riskiest option
(11:0 cents) between the two conditions (pay-all minus pay-
one) was positively correlated with the difference between the
proportion of risky decisions between the conditions (pay-all
minus pay-one), r = 0.35, p = 0.03. In other words, the less
positively the participants rated the riskiest option in the pay-
one condition, the less risky were their decisions in that
condition.
Electrophysiology: FRN and reward positivity
amplitudes
Awithin-subject ANOVA on FRN amplitudes with task con-
dition (pay-one, pay-all) and monetary feedback (positive,
negative) as factors revealed a significant main effect of feed-
back (F(1,39) = 41.0, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.03), indicating more
negative amplitudes for negative feedback than for positive
feedback, and a statistically significant interaction of condi-
tion and feedback (F(1,39) = 4.1, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.003). As
Figure 2. Less risky decisions in the pay-one condition than in the pay-all
condition in the risk game (left) and the risk questionnaire (right). Error
bars indicate within-subject 95% confidence intervals as prescribed by
Loftus & Masson (1994)
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indicated in Figure 4, FRN amplitudes were less affected by
the valence of the feedback in the pay-one condition com-
pared to the pay-all condition. Figure 5 illustrates the interac-
tion effect on FRNmean amplitudes. We conducted post-hoc t
tests on the effect of payment conditions on positive and neg-
ative feedback separately. The difference between payment
conditions was t(39) = 1.8, p = 0.08 for positive feedback
and t(39) = 0.3, p = 0.8 for negative feedback. The post-hoc
tests revealed that the interaction effect was not driven by the
effect of payment conditions on either positive or negative
feedback alone. In order to isolate the interaction effect using
a standard difference wave approach (Holroyd & Krigolson,
2007; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015), we computed the reward
positivity as the difference between the ERPs to positive mi-
nus negative feedback stimuli. The reward positivity was
smaller in the pay-one condition than in the pay-all condition,
t(39) = 2.0, p = 0.05, d = 0.3 (mean reward positivity
amplitude in the pay-one condition = 1.7 μV, SE = 0.5 μV;
mean reward positivity amplitude in the pay-all condition =
3.1 μV, SE = 0.6 μV). The scalp distribution of the reward
positivity was frontal-central (Figure 6), confirming the iden-
tification of this component as the reward positivity.
Only first condition analyzed The difference of reward posi-
tivity amplitudes was not statistically significant when only
the data for the first block of every participant were analyzed,
t(36.84) = 1.9, p = 0.07, d = 0.6 (mean reward positivity
amplitude in the pay-one condition = 1.8 μV, SE: 0.5 μV;
mean reward positivity amplitude in the pay-all condition =
3.9 μV, SE: 0.6 μV).
Correlation reward positivity and risk behavior
The difference in reward positivity amplitudes between con-
ditions (pay-all minus pay-one) was associated with the dif-
ference in risky behavior between conditions (pay-all minus
Figure 3. Valence, arousal and riskiness ratings for all risk options and both conditions. Risky options were ratedmore positively in the pay-all condition.
Error bars indicate standard errors
Figure 4. ERP amplitudes for negative monetary feedback (red) and
positive monetary feedback (green) in the pay-one condition (left) and
the pay-one condition (right). Grey areas indicate the time window for
FRN/reward positivity analysis.
Figure 5 Mean FRN amplitudes with standard errors, illustrating the
significant interaction of payment condition and monetary feedback
192 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2019) 19:187–196
pay-one), r = 0.37, p = 0.02 (Figure 7). In other words, par-
ticipants with smaller reward positivity amplitudes in the pay-
one condition also selected the risky choices less often in the
pay-one condition compared with the pay-all condition.
P300 amplitudes
Finally, a within-subjects ANOVA on P300 amplitude with task
condition (pay-one, pay-all) and monetary feedback (positive,
negative) as factors revealed a significant main effect of feed-
back, F(1,39) = 32.9, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.04, indicating higher
P300 amplitudes for positive feedback (M: 12.6 μV, SE: 0.9
μV) than for negative feedback (M: 10.3 μV, SE: 0.8 μV)
(Figure 8). The main effect of condition did not reach signifi-
cance,F(1,39) = 2.4, p = 0.1, η2 = 0.01, as well as the interaction
effect between feedback and condition,F(1,39) = 0.3, p= 0.6,η2
= 0.00. The scalp distribution of the component was parietal,
consistent with its identification as the P300 (Figure 9).
Critically, in contrast to the reward positivity, the main effect
of condition was not statistically significant (p = 0.1).
The number of trials to quantify the reward positivity and
P300 amplitudes in the different conditions were as follows:
positive feedback/pay-one: M = 33.5, SD = 4.7 (range: 22-
46); positive feedback/pay-all: M = 32.1, SD = 5.0 (range: 20-
42); negative feedback/pay-one: M = 32.4, SD = 4.8 (range:
24-44); negative feedback/pay-all: M = 32.1, SD = 4.7 (range:
22-43). These numbers meet the recommendation by Marco-
Pallares et al. (2011) for at least 20 trials to measure a stable
FRN. Please note that the number of trials did not allow for
further differentiating the ERP results according to the five
presented option combinations.
Discussion
Risk behavior is the main dependent variable in economic
paradigms on risky decision-making, where it is assumed that
participants base each decision on the expected reward it will
elicit. Typically, participants’ behavior is assessed through a
series of trials, with the winnings paid out at the end of the
experiment. To avoid excessive costs, researchers developed
the pay-one method, which entails paying out only one ran-
domly selected trial at the end of the experiment. Although
this pay-one method is usually treated as equivalent to the
pay-all method, in which all of the trials are paid out (De
Martino et al., 2010; Levy et al., 2010), the pay-one method
is actually riskier, given that a single unfavorable outcome in
Figure 7 Reduced reward positivity amplitudes in the pay-one condition
compared with the pay-all condition are significantly associated with
fewer risky choices in the pay-one condition compared to the pay-all
condition. ΔRewP indicates the difference in reward positivity
amplitude between the two conditions (pay-all minus pay-one), and
ΔRisk indicates the difference between the percentages of risky
decisions between the two conditions (pay-all minus pay-one)
Figure 8 ERP amplitudes for negative monetary feedback (red) and
positive monetary feedback (green) in the pay-one condition (left) and
the pay-one condition (right). Grey areas indicate the time window for
P300 analysis
Figure 6 Scalp distribution of the reward positivity (RewP), computed as
difference in FRN amplitudes (positive feedback minus negative
feedback), in the pay-one and the pay-all conditions
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the experiment can result in the participant leaving the exper-
iment with no winnings at all. Therefore, in line with previous
findings (Schmidt & Hewig, 2015), we predicted that partic-
ipants would select riskier choices less often in the pay-one
condition relative to the pay-all condition. Furthermore, we
expected that participants would exert more cognitive control
in the pay-one condition to keep themselves from choosing
the risky option. Based on the literature (Holroyd &
Umemoto, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2017), the reward positivity
is smaller in situations and populations associated with in-
creased levels of cognitive control. We therefore predicted that
reward positivity amplitude would be smaller in the pay-one
condition relative to the pay-all condition and that this ampli-
tude reduction would be associated with the difference in risky
behavior across participants. These predictions were con-
firmed, indicating that the two payment methods significantly
differ in terms of behavior and neuronal responses.
Importantly, our study ruled out several alternative expla-
nations for these findings. First, these findings cannot result
from the fact that the two payment conditions were presented
to the participants sequentially. When we analyzed only the
payment condition that was presented first, the results
remained statistically significant. In fact, the effect sizes were
even twice as big in this between-subjects analysis as com-
pared to the within-subjects analysis (d = 0.8 vs. d = 0.4 for
risk decisions, d = 0.6 vs. d = 0.3 for reward positivity ampli-
tudes), despite excluding half of the data. Therefore, present-
ing both payment conditions in succession appears to wash
out rather than drive the effect.
Second, it might be argued that the reduction in reward pos-
itivity amplitude reflects a general diminution of motivation or
arousal in the pay-one condition. Two observations argue
against this possibility. First, motivation (Weiss, 1965) and
arousal (Schmidt et al., 2013) are associated with faster re-
sponses. However, response times did not differ between pay-
ment conditions in this study, suggesting that the two payment
conditions did not elicit different levels of arousal and motiva-
tion. Likewise, larger P300 amplitudes are associated with en-
hanced levels of motivation (Carrillo-de-la-Pena & Cadaveira,
2000), but we did not observe a difference in P300 amplitudes
between the pay-one and pay-all conditions, again indicating
that motivation levels did not differ between the conditions.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that the reduced
reward positivity amplitudes in the pay-one condition do not
result from lower levels of arousal or motivation.
Third, it is possible that participants perceived the rewards as
being less valuable in the pay-one condition relative to the pay-
all condition, resulting in a smaller reward positivity in the
former compared with the latter. For example, participants
might have applied an inaccurate heuristic in the pay-one con-
dition, such as by estimating their possible winning on each trial
by multiplying the outcome by 100 instead of by 120. Yet, this
interpretation would suggest that participants would rate all
possible choices as less positive in the pay-one condition rela-
tive to the pay-all condition, which is not what we observed
(Figure 3, left panel). Rather, participants rated only the riskiest
choices as less positive in the pay-one condition relative to the
pay-all condition. Therefore, the relatively smaller reward pos-
itivity amplitudes in the pay-one condition appear not to result
from differences in reward valuation across the conditions.
We conclude that the choice of payment method has severe
consequences on decision-making. Participants in the pay-all
condition behave almost risk-neutral, choosing the riskier op-
tion in about 50% of trials, which accords with economic the-
ories that predict risk-neutral behavior when stakes are relative-
ly low (Rabin, 2000). Interestingly, prospect theory even pre-
dicts riskier behavior in the pay-one condition as low probabil-
ities (1/120) are overestimated to a greater extent than high
values (outcomes times 120) are underestimated, according to
the formulas presented in Tversky & Kahneman, 1992. In con-
trast, participants in the pay-one condition are 12% more risk
averse. Thus, contrary to the common assumption that paying
out only one randomly selected trial is equivalent to paying out
all of the trials, both behavior and neural activity in fact differ
between the payment methods. Although paying out every trial
may be prohibitively expensive when the stakes are high, lower
stakes are often sufficient to achieve the intended scientific aim.
For example, Cameron (1999) showed that raising the stakes to
three times the monthly expenditure of an average participant in
theUltimatumGame did not significantly impact the proposer’s
behavior. This observation suggests that it is the relative differ-
ence between outcomes that mainly affects behavior, not the
absolute value of the outcomes.
Our findings are important for both economists and neuro-
scientists who are interested in optimizing their experimental
paradigms. To make absolute statements concerning risk
Figure 9 Scalp distributions of the P300 component for negative and positive feedback in the pay-one and the pay-all condition
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behavior and to obtain strong neuronal responses to rewards,
we recommend that participants are paid all of the winnings
they receive across all trials in an experiment, given that pay-
ing out only one randomly selected trial leads to less risky
behavior and reduces neuronal responses to rewards.
Acknowledgements The authors thank Natalie Gittner, Tabitha Mantey,
Sophie-Marie Rostalski, and Cerstin Seyboldt for help with data
acquisition.
Author contributions B. Schmidt developed the study concept. All au-
thors contributed to the study design. Testing and data collection were
performed by L. Keßler and H. Hecht. B. Schmidt performed the data
analysis and interpretation under the supervision of C. B. Holroyd. B.
Schmidt drafted the manuscript, and C. B. Holroyd, J. Hewig, and W. H.
R. Miltner provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final
version of the manuscript for submission.
References
Baker, T. E., & Holroyd, C. B. (2011). Dissociated roles of the anterior
cingulate cortex in reward and conflict processing as revealed by the
feedback error-related negativity and the N200. Biological
Psychology, 87, 25-34. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.
2011.01.010
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: The self-
assessment manikin and the semantic differential. Journal of
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 25, 49-59. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(94)90063-9
Cameron, L. A. (1999). Raising the stakes in the Ultimatum Game:
Experimental evidence from Indonesia. Economic Inquiry, 37, 47-
59. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01415.x
Carrillo-de-la-Pena, M. T., & Cadaveira, F. (2000). The effect of motiva-
tional instructions on P300 amplitude. Clinical Neurophysiology,
30, 232-239. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0987-7053(00)00220-3
Cherniawsky, A. S., & Holroyd, C. B. (2013). High temporal dis-
counters overvalue immediate rewards rather than undervalue
future rewards: an event-related potential study. Cognitive,
Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 13, 36-45. doi: https://
doi.org/10.3758/s13415-012-0122-x
Debener, S., Thorne, J., Schneider, T. R., & Viola, F. C. (2010).
Using ICA for the analysis of multi-channel EEG data. In M.
Ullsperger, & S. Debener (Eds.), Simultaneous EEG and fMRI:
recording, analysis and application (pp. 121-134). Oxford, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Delorme, A., &Makeig, S. (2004). EEGLAB: an open source toolbox for
analysis of single-trial EEG dynamics including independent com-
ponent analysis. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 134, 9–21. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2003.10.009
De Martino, B., Camerer, C. F., Adolphs, R. (2010). Amygdala damage
eliminates monetary loss aversion. PNAS, 107, 3788-3792. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0910230107
Donchin, E., & Coles, M. G. H. (1988). Is the P300 component a
manifestation of context updating? Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 11, 355-425.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*power 3: A
flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral,
and biomedical sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175-191.
doi: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146
Gehring, W. J., & Willoughby, A. R. (2002). The medial frontal cortex
and the rapid processing of monetary gains and losses. Science, 295,
2279–2282. doi: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1066893
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Halladay, B. (2016). Experimental
methods: Pay one or pay all. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 131, 141-150. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jebo.2016.08.010
Hewig, J., Kretschmer, N., Trippe, R. H., Hecht, H., Coles, M. G. H.,
Holroyd, C. B., & Miltner, W. H. R. (2010). Hypersensitivity to
reward in problem gamblers. Biological Psychiatry, 67, 781-783.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.11.009
Hewig, J., Kretschmer, N., Trippe, R. H., Hecht, H., Coles, M. G. H.,
Holroyd, C. B., & Miltner, W. H. R. (2011). Why humans deviate
from rational choice. Psychophysiology, 48, 507-514. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01081.x
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human
error processing: reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-
related negativity. Psychological Review, 109, 679-709. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.109.4.679
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2008). Dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex integrates reinforcement history to guide voluntary be-
havior. Cortex, 44, 548-559. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cortex.2007.08.013
Holroyd, C. B., Pakzad-Vaezi, K. L., & Krigolson, O. E. (2008). The
feedback correct-related positivity: sensitivity of the event-related
brain potential to unexpected positive feedback. Psychophysiology,
45, 688-697. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00668.x
Holroyd, C. B., & Umemoto, A. (2016). The research domain criteria
framework: The case for anterior cingulate cortex.Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 71, 418–443. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
neubiorev.2016.09.021
Huang, Y., Hu, P., & Li, X. (2017). Undervaluing delayed rewards
explains adolescents’ impulsivity in intertemporal choice: an
ERP study. Scientific Reports, 7, 42631. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1038/srep42631
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291. doi: https://doi.
org/10.2307/1914185
Kreussel, L., Hewig, J., Kretschmer, N., Hecht, H., Coles, M. G., &
Miltner, W. H. (2012). The influence of the magnitude, probability,
and valence of potential wins and losses on the amplitude of the
feedback negativity. Psychophysiology, 49, 207–219. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01291.x
Lakens, D. (2013). Calculating and reporting effect sizes to facilitate
cumulative science: a practical primer for t-tests and ANOVAs.
Frontiers in Psychology. doi: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.
2013.00863
Levy, I., Snell, J., Nelson, A. J., Rustichini, A., & Glimcher, P. W. (2010).
Neural representation of subjective value under risk and ambiguity.
Journal of Neurophysiology, 103, 1036-1047. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1152/jn.00853.2009
Loftus, G. R., & Masson, M. E. (1994). Using confidence intervals in
within-subject designs. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1, 476–
490. doi: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03210951
Marco-Pallares, J., Cucurell, D., Münte, T. F., Strien, N., & Rodrigues-
Fornells, A. (2011). On the number of trials needed for a stable
feedback-related negativity. Psychophysiology, 48, 852-860. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01152.x
Miltner, W. H., Braun, C. H., & Coles, M. G. (1997). Event-related brain
potentials following incorrect feedback in a time-estimation task:
Evidence for a Bgeneric^ neural system for error detection.
Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 9, 788–798. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1162/jocn.1997.9.6.788
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: an integrative theory of P3a and P3b.
Clinical Neurophysiology, 118, 2128-2148. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.clinph.2007.04.019
Proudfit, G. H. (2015). The reward positivity: From basic research on
reward to a biomarker for depression. Psychophysiology, 52, 449-
459. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12370
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2019) 19:187–196 195
R Development Core Team. (2016). R: A language and environment for
statistical computing [Computer software manual]. Vienna, Austria.
Retrieved from http://www.R-project.org/ (ISBN 3-900051-07-0)
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration
theorem. Econometrica, 68, 1281-1292. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1111/1468-0262.00158
Sambrook, T. D., & Goslin, J. (2015). A neural reward prediction error
revealed by a meta-analysis of ERPs using great grand averages.
Psychological Bulletin, 141, 213-235. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/
bul0000006
Sato, A., Yasuda, A., Ohira, H., Miyawaki, K., Nishikawa, M., Kumano,
H., & Kuboki, T. (2005). Effects of value and reward magnitude on
feedback negativity and P300. Cognitive Neuroscience and
Neuropsychology, 16, 407-411.
Schmidt, B., & Hewig, J. (2015). Paying out one or all trials: a behavioral
economic evaluation of payment methods in a prototypical risky
decision study. The Psychological Record, 65, 245-250. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40732-014-0112-1
Schmidt, B., Holroyd, C. B., Debener, S., & Hewig, J. (2017). I can’t wait!
Neural reward signals in impulsive individuals exaggerate the differ-
ence between immediate and future rewards. Psychophysiology, 54,
409-415. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12796
Schmidt, B., Kanis, H., Holroyd, C. B., Miltner, W. H. R., & Hewig J.
(2018). Anxious gambling: Anxiety is associated with higher frontal
midline theta predicting less risky decisions. Psychophysiology. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.13210
Schmidt, B., Mussel, P., & Hewig, J. (2013). I’m too calm—let’s take
a risk! On the impact of state and trait arousal on risk taking.
Psychophysiology, 50, 498–503. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/
psyp.12032
Thaler, R. H., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., & Schwartz, A. (1997). The
effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking: An experimental
test. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 647-661. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1162/003355397555226
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory:
Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574
Walsh, M. M. & Anderson, J. R. (2012). Learning from experience:
Event-related potential correlates of reward processing, neural
adaptation, and behavioral choice. Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 36, 1870–1884. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.neubiorev.2012.05.008
Wu, Y., & Zhou, X. (2009). The P300 and reward valence, magnitude,
and expectancy in outcome evaluation. Brain Research, 1286, 114-
122. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2009.06.032
Yeung, N., & Sanfey, A. G. (2004). Independent coding of reward
magnitude and valence in the human brain. Journal of
Neuroscience, 24, 6258-6264. doi: https://doi.org/10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4537-03.2004
196 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2019) 19:187–196
